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INDUCING BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
A recent New York case, Stiffler v. Boehm (1924, Sup. Ct. Spec.
T.) 2o6 N. Y. Supp. 187, denied recovery for alienating the affections
of a fiancee on the ground that "though an action of the character
mentioned is maintainable against one who meddles with the spouse
of another," "its basis is loss of consortium," and "such loss cannot
arise in the case of a single man or woman." The court criticized the
[526]
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earlier New York case of Guida v. Pontrelli.' There recovery was
also denied, but on the ground that, for the purpose of the particular
action, the contract to marry was like any ordinary "business contract,"
for inducing breach of which no action could lie in New York "unless
fraud .or other tortious means" were employed. These cases, there-
fore, raise the question how far the marriage "contract," and more
especially the "contract to marry," is and may be treated like an
ordinary "business contract."
"Business contract" is no more than a convenient label given to cer-
tain operative facts to which courts will apply fairly-well-settled rules.
The words are, nevertheless, helpful as denoting the normal situation
to which these rules will apply, as distinguished from the situation
where they will not.2 For whereveri~iuman relations become "affected
with a public interest" courts incline to throw over established rules
and treat the situation as sui generis. A "business contract," by vio-
lating some tenet of public welfare, may fall entirely outside of the
normal rule of "contracts."3  A property right, said, under normal
conditions, to be "vested," may cease to be such where the interests
of the community become involved.4  And since the institution of
marriage lies so close to the foundations of society, it is natural that
courts should incline to place it entirely within a class of its own,5 not
to be "assimilated to any other contract whatsoever.' 7  And this is
'(1921, Sup. Ct Spec. T.) 114 Misc. 181, 186 N. Y. Supp. 147.
-The fact that the rules that have developed from the "normal" situation, as
represented by the label, are more or less definite, sometimes induces courts first
to draw the situation before them within the scope of the label, and then to
apply the rules that normally go with the label. It is recognized that this is
a convenient and valuable method. But there is the danger that in treating the
label as an end and not a means, the court may rest its decision on form, rather
than on substance. Cf. "permanent" in obtaining an easement by prescription.
(1924) 34 YAiPn LAw JoURNAL, 2io; "sale" in food cases. (924) 34 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 211; "passenger" in carrier cases. Moffit v. Grand Rapids Ry. (1924,
Mich.) 2oo N. W. 274; "vested right" CommENTS (1925) 34 YAM LAw JOURNAL,
303; Cf. Sturges, Unincorporated Associations (1924) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL,
383, 396, 397.
'See 3 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 1628 et seq.
'See CommFNTs (1925) 34 YAix LAw JOURNAL, 303, 307.
Story, Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1846) sec. io9.
'Gordon v. Pye (1815) 3 Eng. Eccl. R. 430, 468.
'In New York, and in many other states, the marriage "contract" is defined
as a "civil contract." N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill's ed. 1923) ch. 14, see. 1O. This,
however, does not mean that it is an ordinary "business contract." See supra
note 2. The statutes mean simply that "since the reformation, it has been
regarded as a civil contract," as "distinguished from a religious sacrament."
Clayton v. Wardell (1850) 4 N. Y. 23o, 232; Crouch, Annulment of Marriage
for Fraud in New York (1921) 6 CORN. L. QUART. 40I, 402. * "But it is not
thereby made synonymous with the word 'contract' as employed in the common
law." Wade v. Kalbfleisch (1874) 58 N. Y. 282, 284. Nevertheless the label
of "contract" has perhaps tended to induce the New York courts to reach the
very liberal doctrine laid down in Di Lorenzo v. Di Loreto (19o3) 174 N. Y.
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particularly true where the marriage "contract" has been consummated.8
It is then said to have "ripened into the complication of a public
status,"9 the word being used merely as another convenient label. The
relation has then become one of public concern, and thereafter moral,
social, and religious considerations will almost exclusively control. 10
But while the contract is still "executory," though it partakes at
times of the nature of the status," there is a tendency to treat it as
"having all the properties of any other contract."' 2 Thus, in its for-
mation, there must be good consideration; mutual promises will suf-
467, 472, 67 N. E. 63, 64, where the court said: "The free and full consent,
which is of the essence of all ordinary contracts, is expressly made by the
statute necessary to the validity of the marriage contract."8
"Consummation" of the marriage "contract," when looked at from the
point of view of breach of the promise to marry, takes place when " the parties
enter into a present agreement to take each other for husband and wife." Clay-
ton v. Wardell, supra note 7, at p. 232; Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (6th ed.
1881) sec. 2. No ceremony is necessary. Adger v. Ackerman (19o2, C. C. A.
8th) 115 Fed. 124. "The only difference between a marriage celebrated by a
formal ceremony, and one not so celebrated, is that, in the former case, the
regular celebration is conclusive evidence of the mutual consent requisite to the
validity of the marriage, while in the latter it is competent to rebut the proof
of the marriage by other evidence." Clayton v. Wardell, loc. cit. supra. But
where courts are looking at the marriage "contract" from the point of view
of its annulment, consummation has a different meaning, and has an important
bearing on the question whether or not the relation shall be considered that of
a "business contract" or of a "status." "If, before children are begotten, before
debts are contracted, real estate involved, and the community has long recog-
nized the relation, the parties seek relief from fraud, error, or duress, it seems
clear that no consideration of public policy will prevent a court from annulling
a marriage where the relation has not fully ripened into the complications of
a public status." Nelson, Divorce and Separation (1895) sec. 6oo; see Svensen
v. Svensen (1904) 178 N. Y. 54, 61, 7o N. E. I2O, 121; Moore v. Moore (1916,
Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 94 Misc. 370, 157 N. Y. Supp. 8ig.
'Nelson, loc. cit. supra note 8.
10 In criticizing the doctrine of Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, supra note 7, Justice
Benedict, of the Brooklyn Supreme Court, said,: "I shall decline to grant an
annulment in this case, as it is against the public welfare. The strength of our
nation has been derived in large measure from the moral fibre of our Pilgrim
and Puritan ancestors, to whom marriage was a life partnership .... Unless the
present trend of society . .. toward 'free love,' 'trial marriages,' and 'easy
divorce' shall be checked, it will surely result in national disgrace, if not in
national ruin." New York Times (Dec. 5, 1924). So in similar cases courts
will be found reasoning from the Bible, from the marriage ceremony, and from
their emotions. See Matchin v. Matchin (1847) 6 Pa. 332, 337; Allen's Appeal
(1881) 99 Pa. 196, 200; Stapleton v. Poynter (1gol) ii Ky. 264, 269, 62 S. W.
730, 731; Wightman v. Coates (1&18) I5 Mass. I, 3. Cf. status in questions of
service of process. Beale, Progress of the Law, 1918-99,--The Conflict of
Laws (919) 33" Iv. L. REV. I, 12, 13.
' Fianc~s "occupy a certain status or relation to one another until the time
for performance. Therefore, during the engagment the parties are bound to
certain proprieties of behavior." 2 Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 1O3i.
' Bishop, loc. cit. supra note 8; Williston, loc. cit. supra note ii.
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fice,'" which need not be express, but may be implied from the conduct
and conversations of the parties;" and the consideration must not in-
volve what is immoral or against public policy.1 5 An agreement
induced. by fraud, such as the concealment of lack of chastity, will
justify the breaking of the promise;16 inability to perform the func-
tions of marriage will excuse the non-carrying out of the contract to
marry;17 there must be consideration for the release of the promise;"'
an action will lie for anticipatory breach19 as well as for refusal to
marry on a given day; 20 an infant has the power to avoid his contract
to marry while the adult must remain bound ;21 and the contract is in
general held to be an agreement within the meaning of the statute
of frauds.22 On the other hand, where considerations of public policy
or the peculiar personal nature of the obligations enter in, the "contract
to marry" ceases to be a mere "business contract." Actions for breach
of the "contract to marry" do not, by the more general rule, survive
in favor of or against an administrator or executor ;23 the jury fixes the
" Standiford v. Gentry (1862) 32 Mo. 477.
"4 Connolly v. Bollinger (191o) 67 W. Va. 30, 67 S. E. 71.
"See Connolly v. Bollinger, supra note 14, at p. 35.
"'See the cases collected in Williston, supra note iI, at note 59. Sec. 1031
passim indicates the degrees of fraud necessary to vitiate the "contract."
"TIt is said that "'act of God,' occurring after the' contract is made, whereby
one becomes physically incapable of performing the functions of marriage, will
justify" its non-performance by either of the parties. Bishop, loc. cit. supra
note 8.
"Fisher v. Barber (igia) 62 Tex. Civ. App. 34, 13o S. W. 871; cf. King v.
Gillett (184o, Exch.) 7 M. & W. 55.
'Bracken v. Dinning (igio) 141 Ky. 265, 132 S. W. 425.
- Wightman v. Coates, supra note 1o.
'Davie v. Padgett (915) 117 Ark. 544, 176 S. W. 333.
'Derby v. Phelps (1822) 2 N. -. 515; Nichols v. Weaver (1871) 7 Kan. 373;
contra: Blackburn v. Mann (1877) 85 Ill. 2. In Brick v. Gannar (1885, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) 36 Hun. 52, 54, the court removed the "contract to marry" from the
scope of a "business contract," saying: "To require those promises to be reduced
to writing, to prevent their being utterly void, if not to be performed within
one year, would certainly be contrary to the natural usages of life."
"Stebbins v. Palmer (1822, Mass.) I Pick. 7F; Wade v. Kalbfleisch, supra
note 7; contra: Allan v. Baker (1882) 86 N. C. 91. In Shuler v. Millsap's Ex'r.
(1874) 71 N. C. 297, an action was allowed to survive in favor of the promisee's
estate. There are dicta to the effect that the action will survive if special
damage is alleged. See Flint v. Gilpin (1887) 29 W. Va. 740, 743, 3 S. E. 33,
35; but cf. Quirk v. Thoinas [1915] 1 K. B. 798. Even where statutes provide
that actions "founded on contract shall survive" recovery may be denied, on the
ground that the "contract to marry" is a contract "in form only." Warner v.
Benham (1923, Wash.) 218 Pac. 26o. But the inconsistent attitude of courts in
this regard is shown by the fact that this court distinguished the case of Forres-
ter v. Southern Pac. Co. (913) 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753, where the plaintiff
had purchased a railway ticket, and was "insulted and humiliated by the train
officials," was put off the train, and died later, saying, this action "grows out of
a contract in substance." Warner v. Benham, supra at p. 262.
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amount of the damages without regard for the rules of "contract," 24
and punitive damages may be imposed ;25 and there can be no recovery 6
against a third party for inducing breach of the "contract. ' '27
The situation in the instant case is perhaps one in which public
interest so enters as to remove it properly from the "business contract."
But the grounds upon which the court rests its decision are not con-
vincing. In the first place, actions for the alienation of the affections
of a spouse are now availiable to either husband or wife,2 except as
against a parent acting in good faith.20 The basis is loss of consor-
tium.80 . In the case of engaged persons the right to consortium is a
future one; but that fact should not prevent the court from protecting
is as far as they do where it is a present right.31  Indeed, the
"See Wade v. Kalbfleisch, supra note 7.
"Wells v. Padgett (85o, N. Y. Sup Ct) 8 Barb. 323.
'See infra note 35.
' For other considerations inducing courts to treat the "contract to marry"
as sui generis see Wade v. Kalbfleisch, supra note 7, at pp. 285, 286, 287.
"Bennett v. Bennett (1889) ii6 N. Y. 584, 23 N. E. 17; Sins v. Sims (I91o)
79 N. J. L. 577, 76 Atl. IO63; Schouler, Husband and Wife (1882) sec. 64.
2. Wilson v. Wilson (ig16) 115 Me. 341, 98 Atl. 938; Bourne v. Bourne (1ig)
43 Calif..App. 516,',85 Pac. 489; Heisler v. Heisler (ipiI) 15, Iowa, 503, 127
N. W. 823; Schouler, loc. cit. supra note 28.
' Since the passing of married women's statutes a wife has been able to
recover for loss of consortium due to the wilful and intentional act of the
defendant. Work v. Campbell (1912) 164 Calif. 343, 128 Pac. 943; Flander-
nwyer v. Cooper (912) 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 2O2. But the exact nature of
the right to consortium is difficult to ascertain. There is no need to prove pecu-
niary loss. Rice v. Rice (i895) lO4 Mich. 371, 62 N. W. 833. The husband can
recover whether the loss was caused by a malicious, or only a negligent act.
Holbrook, Meaning of Consortium (1923) 22 MicH. L. RFv. 1, 2. The wife
cannot in general recover if the injury is caused by negligence. Emerson v.
Taylor (I918) 133 Md. 192, 2O4 Atl. 538; contra: Hipp v. Dupont Co. (192I)
182 N. C. 9, io8 S. E. 318. The nature of the right, therefore, seems to change
with the person suing. Sometimes it is said the right to consorthm is a
"property" right. Eliason v. Draper (i9IO) 25 Del. 1, 11, 77 At. 572, 576;
see Snedaker v. King (1924, Ohio) 145 N. E. i5, 19. But whether it is a
"property" or merely a "personal" right should not affect the attitude of the
courts in protecting it.
'
1 In Devenbagh v. Devenbagh (1836, N. Y. Ch.) 5 Paige, 553, an annulment
suit, the New York court ordered a physical examination of the defendant to
determine the truth of the plaintiff's charge of impotency. But in Welch v.
Verduin (1923, Sup. Ct) 121 Misc. 545, 2O2 N. Y. Supp. 324, a breach of
promise case, such examination was refused, in spite of the fact that in general
elsewhere such examination may be ordered. Schroeder v. Chicago R. I. & P.
R. R. (1877) 47 Iowa, 375. A statute had been passed in New York allowing
such examinations in personal injury actions. N. Y. Laws, 1893, ch. 721, now
C P. A. sec. 3o6. The court reasoned that the statute intended to exclude
examinations in all other actions. The breach of promise suit, therefore, fell
outside in spite of the fact that the New York court had said "although in
form this action resembles an action on contract, in substance it falls within the
definition of the exception, as an action for personal injuries." See Wade v.
Kalbfleish, supra note 7, at p. 287.
COMMENTS
New York court itself has paved the way for such a decision by allow-
ing a husband to recover for the seduction of his wife that took place
while they were still engaged. The ground given was loss of consor-
tium, that "instead of losing what he once had he has been prevented
from getting it when he was entitled to it. This is a difference in
form only and is without substantial foundation.13 2  In the second
place, the loss of consortium, of dower rights and of the other "valu-
able endowments" that go with the marriage relation, might well be
protected against interference by third parties, just as are the rights
in executory contracts for personal service.33 Guida v. Pontrelli34
treated the question in this way, and the logic of that decision is not
lessened by the remark in the instant case that the court "did not mean"
what it so evidently. said. In the third place, practically all the cases
cited in the instant case 5 can be traced back to a statement by Mr.
'Kujek v. Goldman (1896) i5o N. Y. 176, 181, 44 N. E. 773, 775.
For objections to treating the "contract to marry" as a contract of personal
employment see supra note 27. Nevertheless this "contract" is, in many ways,
treated like a "business contract" and a satisfactory rule might well be worked
out on the line of the extensions and modifications of Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q.
B.) 2 El. & BL .2i6. That the doctgine of the action for inducing breach of
contract was expected to apply to a "contract to marry" is indicated by the
remark of Stirling, L. J., in Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Feder-
ation. [1903] 2 K. B. 545, 577, that "the interference with contractual relations
may in some cases be justified... For example, I think that a father who dis-
covered that a child of his had entered into an.engagement to marry a person
of immoral character would not only be justified in interfering to prevent that
contract being carried into effect, but would greatly fail in his duty to his child
if he did not" See also Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARv.
L. Rav. 663, 68?. It is clear that the present trend of the courts in interpreting
"justification" would enable the working out of a satisfactory rule in breach of
promise to marry cases. See Legris v. Marcotte (19o6) 129 Ill. App. 67 (where
one who had children in school was held justified in procuring the dismissal of
children who were diseased); Brimlow v. Casson (1923, Cb. Div.) 13 L. T. R.
725 (where members of a union were held justified in inducing girls, paid so
little that they were forced into prostitution, to break their contracts of employ-
ment). See Overhultz v. Row (1922) 152 La. 9, 92 So. 716. Compare also
CO MENTS (1925) 10 CORN. L. QUART. 259; (1925) 25 COL L. REV. 22_.
" Supra note i.
'The discovered cases that exist on, this subject may be analyzed as follows:
Leonard v. Whetstone (1903) 34 Ind. App. 383, 68 N E. 197: based on
Cooley's statement, and cites no cases; Mead v. Baum (9o8) 76 N. 3. L. 337,
341, 69 AtI. 962, 963: a dictum, which cites no cases; Homan v. Hall (1917) 102
Neb. 7o, 165 N. W. 88t: based on Cooley's statement, and cites no cases; Guida
v. Pontrelli, supra note i: recovery denied because in New York no action will
lie for inducing breach of contract unless fraud or other tortious means are
employed; Overhultz v. Row, supra note 33: recovery denied, one ground being
that a statute imposing on a father responsibility for damages occasioned by
minor children did not apply to breaches of contract; Davis v. Condit (1914)
124 Minn. 365, 144 N. W. io89: no recovery for the debauching of a fiancie,
but an inference that an action might lie for inducing the breach of the marriage
contract; Case v. Smith (1895) lO7 Mich. 416, 65 N. W. 279: action for seduc-
tion and alienation of affections.
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Justice Cooley, that there can be no action for interference with a
"contract to marry" "however contemptible and blameable may be the
conduct."386 This statement is unsupported by cases; and in the same
volume Mr. Cooley says: "an action cannot in general be maintained
for inducing a third person to break his contract." 37  This text-book
was written before Lumley v. Gye,38 and its extensions, became the
accepted law.39
Nevertheless, the fact that the few cases directly on this subject are
so unanimous in their result is significant as indicating that courts feel
that this" is a matter in which they do not want to interfere. Two
strong tendencies can be seen in the attitude of the courts toward the
institution of marriage. The first is to protect it from every sort of
unfavorable influence. Thus separation contracts are declared void
where they are made in contemplation of separation;40 contracts to
prevent marriages, 41 to restrain marriages 4 2 to bring about mar-
riages,43 are held invalid; as are contracts where the sole consideration
is illicit relations ;44 and actions are sustained for breach of promise,4
5
for alienation of affections,46 and for criminal conversation. Still
further, where these remedies seem to be inadequate, courts of equity
will sometimes issue injunctions to prevent the alienation of affections
of a spouse,47 the debauching of a child, 48 or to keep a wife from
passing off as the child of her husband a child conceived in adultery.49
But the second tendency of the courts is to interfere as little as possible.
Thus there is the rule of evidence that confidential communications
between husband and wife are privileged ;50 there is the refusal in
a recent case to enjoin a third party from attempting to alienate affec-
tions of the husband ;51 and there are these cases that have consistently
denied recovery for inducing breach of the promise to marry.52 It is
Cooley, Law of Torts (2d ed. i888) 277.
"2 Cooley, supra note 33, at p. 581.
'Supra note 33.
Sayre, supra note 34, at p. 670.
See Wells v. Stout (1859) 9 Calif. 479, 494; Fox v. Davis (1873) 133 Mass.
255, 258; cf. COMMENTS (922) 7 CORN. L. QUART. 393.
"Sheppey v. Stevens (1910, C. C. N. D. N. Y.) 177 Fed. 484.
'Lowe v. Dorenu.n (1913) 84 N. J. L. 658, 87 Atl. 459; 3 Williston, op. cit.
supra note II, sec. 1741.
"Morrison v. Rodgers. (1896) 115 Calif. 252, 46 Pac. io72; Williston, loc.
cit. supra note 42. So also of a promise to marry after the death of the present
spouse. Paddock v. Robinson (1872) 63 Ill. 99.
"Hanks v. Naglee (879) 54 Calif. 5I.
"See Williston. loc. cit. supra note ii ; see supra note 2o.
See supra note 28.
"
T Ex parte Warfield (1899) 4o Tex. Crim. App. 413, 50 S. W. 933.
"Stark v. Hamilton (igig) 149 Ga. 227, 99 S. E. 861.
' Vanderbilt v. Mitchell (19o7) 72 N. J. Eq. 91o, 67 Atl. !7.
5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2333.
"Snedaker v. King, supra note 30.
"Supra note 35.
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possible that this "hands-off" tendency is responsible for the result in
the instant case. The action for breach of promise has never been
in good repute; it has been too much abused by unscrupulous persons.
It may be that to allow recovery here would be to extend an already
undesirable rule. It is to be wished, however, that the decisions could
be placed on a more satisfactory footing from the point of view of
legal analysis; or else put frankly on the ground that this is a matter
in which the courts do not want to interfere.
VESTED INTERESTS OF BENEFICIARIES IN INSURANCE POLICIES
It is now well settled that the beneficiary of an "old line" life
insurance policy has what is termed by the courts a "vested interest."'1
The term is usually used to indicate that the insured is powerless to
divest the beneficiary of his right to payment in accordance with the
terms of the policy. Where, however, the insured expressly reserves
to himself the power to change the beneficiary and exercises that power,
the courts frequently assert that the latter has no "vested interest."2
And a similar result is reached in the case of a beneficiary of a mutual
benefit certificate.3 If the problem of the nature of the beneficiary's
interest came up for test only in case of change or attempted change of
beneficiary, the solution would be relatively simple. But when other
legal relations of the parties are involved, the use of the terms "vested"
or "not vested" does not help us. Despite the fact that the jural rela-
tions tested may be other than that of the mere power to change the
beneficiary, too often the label is the same. The terms may be harm-
less when used to describe particular results, but they are unfortunate
when used as a key to solve unrelated problems. The question calls
for an analysis of some of the jural relations created by the issuance
of the policy.
I "It is well settled by the courts of all English-speaking states, with the solitary
exception of Wisconsin, that the rights of the person absolutely designated as the
recipient of the moneys to be paid under a contract of life insurance are vested,
and indefeasible without the consent of the beneficiary. . . It is the right of the
beneficiary that is vested, and not the receipt of the money under the policy that is
assured." Vance, Insurance (1904) 390. Preston v. Connecticut Mutual Imur-
ance Co. (1902) 95 Md. 101, 51 At. 838; Condon v. New York Life Ins. Co.
(1918) 183 Iowa, 658, 166 N. W. 452; Filley v. Illinois Life Ins. Co. (1914) 93
Kan. 193, 144 Pac. 257.
'Hicks v. Northwestern Muctual Life Ins. Co. (1914) 166 Iowa, 532, 147 N. W.
883; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Daley (1914) 25 Calif. App. 376, 143 Pac. 1033;
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. (1921) 2o6 Mo.
App. 676, 229 S. W. 399.
"Carpenter v. Knights of Columbus (1921) 239 Mass. 287, 131 N. E. 863;
Thomas v. Locomotive Engineers' Mutual Life Ins. Assoc. (I92I) 191 Iowa, 1152,
183 N. W. 628; Bills v. Bills (1918, Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 614; Hoeft v.
Supreme Lodge (1896) 113 Calif. 91, 45 Pac. 185; Brown v. Grand Lodge (189o)
8o Iowa, 287, 45 N. W. 884; cf. Lyons v. Knights of Macabees (192o, 4th Dept.)
x92 App. Div. io9, 182 N. Y. Supp. 212.
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The beneficiary of an old line policy has a future conditional right to
payment, a right that will become effective subject to the fulfillment of
specified conditions and after the lapse of a period of time;' an immunity
from the destruction of this right by an attempted change of the
beneficiary or .any other act by the insured or the insurer ;5 a power
and privilege to assign his rights ;6 an immunity from repudiation by
the insured ;7 a privilege and power to preserve his rights by paying the
premiums if the insured defaults. 8 To the beneficiary in a policy with
power of change reserved to the insured most of the decisions accord
exactly the same "rights" accompanied, however, by a liability that all
may be extinguished by the insured's exercise of this reserved power.9
Thus it has been held that he has an immunity from change of the bene-
ficiary in any but the prescribed manner ;10 a privilege and power to
preserve his "rights" by paying the premiums if the insured defaults;"
a privilege and power to assign what "rights" he has.' 2 Similar rights
have been recognized in the beneficiary of a mutual benefit policy, but
with reluctance.13 Thus in McEwen v. New York Life Insurance Co."
"(igi8) 28 YALE LA w JOURNAL', 89.
See supra note i. Brown v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia (i92o) 114 S. C. 202,
103 S. E. 555; Pingrey v. Nat. Ins. Co. (1887) 144 Mass. 374, 1I N. E. 562.
8Dannhauser v. Wallenstein (i9Ol) 169 N. Y. 199, 62 N. E. 16o; Conn. Mit.
Life Ins. Co. v. Allen (920) 235 Mass. 187, 126 N. E. 367. Prior to the death
of the insured a life insurance policy upon which nothing is payable until death
creates no liability to garnishment in the beneficiary. Day v. New England
Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1886) 11 Pa- 507, 4 Atl. 748. But if the policy is matured
or has a cash surrender value it is subject to attachment. Ellison v. Straw (2902)
116 Wis. 2o7, 92 N. W. io94.
"Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (1886) 44 Ohio St. 156, 5 N. E. 417;
Pingrey 'v. Nat. Ins. Co. supra note 5.
1 Mutial Life Ins. Co. v. Hill (9oo) 178 U. S. 347, 20 Sup. Ct. 914; Langford
v. Nat. Life & Acc. Ins. Ca. (9,5) 116 Ark. 527, 173 S. W. 414; see McGlynn v.
Curry (29o3, 2d Dept.) 82 App. Div. 431, 433, 8I N. Y.. Supp. 855, 857.
'See supra note 2.
1 "A reserved right to change the beneficiary does not affect the essential
nature of the rights of the beneficiary so long as they last." Rugg, C. J., in Tyler
v. Treasurer and Receiver General (9,7) 226 Mass. 3o6, 309, 115 N. E. 3oo, 3oi.
Just what facts will operate to bring about a change of beneficiary must be
determined according to the terms of the contract. (Igi) 27 YALE LAw
JOURNAL., 957; (919) 28 ibid. 89; (2919) 33 HI-ARv. L. REv. 124; Neary v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (2928) 92 Conn. 488, 103 Atl. 661; White *v. White
(1922, Sup. Ct.) 194 N. Y. Supp. 114. It has been held that the power to change
the beneficiary does not contemplate a power to surrender the policy without the
consent of the beneficiary. Roberts v. Northwestern National 'Life Ins. Co.
(915) i43 Ga. 780, 85 S. E. 2O43.
u In re Waininan's Estate (1923, Sup. Ct.) 212 Misc. 318,.20o N. Y. Supp. 893.
M-ut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tuemler (x923, Mo.) 251 S. W. 727; cf. Dorsett v.
Thonas (922) 152 La. 59, 92 So. 734-
1
"It is true that a beneficiary named in a death-benefit certificate issued by a
fraternal benefit association, and providing for a change of beneficiary, takes
nothing more than a mere expectancy. (Citing cases.) But that is not necessarily
true of beneficiaries named in an ordinary life insurance policy, although the right
to change the beneficiary in a prescribed manner is reserved." Beach, J., in
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it was held that a gift by the insured to the beneficiary of an old line
policy with power reserved to change operated to extinguish that
power. Yet in Spengler v. Spengler'5 the delivery of a mutual benefit
certificate to the payee was held not ta enlarge the interests of the
beneficiary.
The contrast between the interests of a beneficiary in an "old line"
policy with power reserved to change and a beneficiary of a mutual
benefit certificate has been clearly brought out in two recent cases. In
Frick v. Llewellyn:' it was held that a transfer tax could not be im-
posed on proceeds of policies of insurance on the life of the decedent
Frick, made payable directly or by assignment to members of his family.
Although a power to change the beneficiaries was reserved in some of
the policies, the court said that the designated beneficiaries in all the
policies were vested with certain interests transferred during the life-
time of the insured. Hence the policies and the proceeds thereof
constituted no part of the decedent's estate. Here the term "vested
interest" was obviously used not to describe any single jural relation
but an aggregate of jural relations. The execution and assignment of
the policies had created in the beneficiaries so many "rights" as to
leave in the insured interests too tenuous to carry a succession tax.' 7
In Oetting v. Sparks' the beneficiary of a policy issued by the relief
department of a railroad company assigned his interest in consideration
of the promise that he be subrogated to the rights of the assignee under
its mortgage upon real estate of the insured. It was held that the
assignment of a mere "expectancy"' 9 furnished no consideration for
the agreement that he should be subrogated to the rights of the mort-
gagee. The court thus deemed the beneficiary's interest in the certi-
ficate not sufficient consideration for a contract.20  This indicates again
Neary v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. supra note 1o, at p. 491, lO3 Atl. at p. 662.
"In certificates given by beneficial orders there is usually merely a power conferred
upon the member whose life is insured, to appoint beneficiaries . . . and change the
same." Reed, V. C., in Loconwtive Engineers' Mutual Life Assoc. v. Winterstein
(1899) 58 N. J. Eq. 189, at p. 191, 44 Atl. i99, at p. 2oo. For further expressions
of views as to mutual benefit societies see Shuman v. Ancient Order of United
Workmen (igoo) 1Io Iowa, 642, 82 N. W. 331. (Refers to right of beneficiary
as "vested.") (1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 316.
14 (119) 42 Calif. App. 133, 183 Pac. 373.
1(19o3) 65 N. J. Eq. 176, 55 Atl. 285. But see King v. Supremne Council
(19o7) 216 Pa. 553, 65 Atl. 11o8.
"8 (1924, W. D. Pa.) 298 Fed. 8o3. The statute imposing the tax was also held
unconstitutional on the ground that it provided for the taking of property without
due process of law and for the levy of a direct tax without apportionment.
" In State v. Allis (1921) "174 Wis. 527, 184 N. W. 381, the court said that since
the insured had the power to change the beneficiary he retained a property interest
in the policy which passed on his death. Hence a tax similar to the one in the
Frick case was sustained. Obviously, the reserved power could not pass to the
beneficiary since it was extinguished by the death of the insured.
11 (1923) 1o9 Ohio St. 94, 143 N. E. 184.
"See supra note 3.
"See (924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 766.
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the hesitancy of the courts to accord to .the beneficiary of a mutual
benefit-policy the same interests as are recognized in the beneficiary of
an "old line" policy. The explanation lies perhaps in history. From
early times we have had groups of men in similar circumstances form-
ing associations for mutual aid in disaster.21 At first the mutual pro-
tection and relief was accomplished in a purely charitable manner. Thus
when a member fell ill or died, a fund was collected to relieve the
immediate distress or provide funeral expenses in proportion to the
actual necessity of the occasion. Later the protection was extended
to cover the immediate needs of the family of a deceased member and
the fund so appropriated was in no sense an indemnity against pecuniary
loss by death of such member.2 2 The benevolent character of these
payments was by no means lost when in the course of development these
associations issued certificates for certain sums, thus making more
definite their charitable undertaking. This development may explain
the difference in the treatment of the two types of contracts but one
may doubt whether it is a justification for the prevailing course of
judicial decision.
It is quite trdie that in Oetting v. Sparks the beneficiary had no pres-
ent right to receive payment. But he did have other jural relations
in respect to the policy which should have been regarded as considera-
tion sufficient to support a contract. While there is frequent reference
in the modern decisions to the benevolent character of mutual benefit
societies, it seems that their contracts are steadily approaching in
character those of the old line companies.23 Whether or not the dif-
ference in treatment of the two types of contracts should be perpetuated,
Frick v. Llewellyn and Oetting v. Sparks illustrate a marked distinc-
tion that courts still make in interpreting these contracts, recognizing
in the beneficiary of a mutual benefit certificate a much less important
aggregate of jural relations than in the beneficiary of an old line policy.
NEW YORK REMEDIES FOR ENCROACHING STRUCTURES
The theory of the codes, it has always been understood, is to sub-
stitute for the various forms of action at law and suits in equity one
single form of civil action; but obviously the distinction between in-
junctive and non-injunctive relief still remains. Under the old equity
practice injunctive relief required an express order or mandate of the
court and it would seem that such- an order is still necessary. Yet,
in the case Johnson v. Purpura (1924, 3d Dept.) 208 App. Div. 505,
2o3 N. Y., Supp. 581, the court, while, in effect, refusing to recognize
=i Bacon, Life and Accident Insurance (4th ed. 1917) sec. io et seq.; Vance,
Itnsurance (1904) 27.
"Dickinson v. A. 0. U. W. (1893) 159 Pa. 258, 28 AtI. 293; Commonwealth v.
Equitable Beneficial Assoc. (x89o) 137 Pa. 412, 18 AtI. 1I12.
=Locomotive Engineers' Mutual Life Assoc. v. Winterstein, supra note 13;
Lyons v. Knights of Macabees, supra note 3.
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the albolition of the forms of action and of the distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity, goes the length of giving to a judg-
ment of the form usual in ejectment at common law-that the plain-
tiff is entitled to possession-the force of a mandatory injunction. The
plaintiff had been awarded a judgment that included an injunction to
the defendant to remove that portion of the wall of his building that
encroached on the plaintiff's premises. The court held, with two judges
dissenting, that the injunction was improperly included and should be
stricken out. The decision was put upon the in6onsistent grounds
that in an "action of ejectment" injunctive relief was unauthorized
and that such relief was unnecessary as the judgment in "ejectment"
by implication carried exactly that relief.
For the proposition that the action was one in ejectment the court
relied on Syracuse v. Hogan.' But in that case only one question was
certified to the Court of Appeals, to wit: Was the defendant entitled
to a trial by jury as a matter of right? This question the court, with
three judges dissenting, answered in the affirmative on the ground
that the action necessarily involved the determination of title to the
land alleged to be encroached upon.2  But unfortunately both the
decision and the dissent were couched in the language of common law
pleading, the former insisting that the action was one in ejectment and
the latter contending that it was one in equity. In fact, that action,
as well as that in the instant case, was the only thing it could be-a
code civil action in which the issues of fact were to be tried as such
issues were tried when the constitution of the state was adopted and
in which, after answer by the defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to
receive all the relief, injunctive or otherwise, that the facts alleged and
proved merited.8 The court in the instant case, apparently failing
1 (1923) 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N.' E. 4o6; see COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAw
JoURNAL, 707; NOTES AND COMMENT (1923) 9 CORN. L. QUART. 73.
'On the theory that the right to trial of title by jury existed in all cases at
the time of the adoption of the state constitution and that this right, being guar-
anteed by the constitution, continued unaffected by the various codes enacted
since 1848. But see Kent, Ch., in Smith v. Carll (1821, N. Y.) 5 Johns. Ch. 117;
discussion by Prof. Clark in COMMENTS (923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 707;
NOTES AND COMMENT (1923) 9 CORN. L. QUART. 73; Pomeroy, Equity Juris-
prudence (4th ed. 1919) secs. 252 and i92o. The cases decided in the early years
of the code held that it had abrogated the requirement of a separate law action to
determine title. Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail Factory (1869) 4o N. Y. 191;
Broiesfedt v. South Side R. R. (1873) 55 N. Y. 220. A more recent ruling
compels the plaintiff to get his injunctive relief, if at all, in the same action in
which title is determined. Ham v. Sugo (igoi) 169 N. Y. 1O9, 62 N. E. I35. In
that case it was intimated that trial of the particular issue of title should be by
jury and it was this point that was decided in S'yracuse v. Hogan. But in the
earlier cases trial seems to have been to the court and in Corning v. Troy Iron &
Nail Factory it is definitely stated that this was the method of trial.
'See N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, secs. 8 and 479 (formerly N. Y. C. C. P. 1876, sees.
3339 and 1207 respectively). The true nature of the action and the scope of the
relief to be awarded, the majority in Syracuse v. Hogan in one passage recog-
nized, though in somewhat confusing language: "The Supreme Court has general
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to recognize that the classification of the action made by the court in
Syracuse v. Hogan was solely for the purpose of determining the
existence or non-existence of a right to a jury trial, used that classifica-
tion to deduce the relief to which the plaintiff was entitled, taking its
major premise from common law procedure,-
Still more misleading to the court in the Johnson case was the reply
of the Court of Appeals t6 the contention of the plaintiff in Syracuse
v. Hogan5 that in an action of ejectment it could not recover all the
relief to which it was entitled. After stating that a judgment in an
action of ejectment, in addition to awarding possession, might award
damages for the withholding thereof and damages to cover the costs of
removing encroachments," when this should be necessary, and that
such a judgment might be enforced by execution as provided in sec-
tion 504 of the New York Civil Practice Act, the court went on to say:
"If it cannot be enforced by execution, then the defendant may be
punished for contempt in refusing to comply with the judgment. C.
P. A., sec. 505."7 Reasoning from this statement, the court in the
jurisdiction both in law and'in equity and now there is but one form of civil
action. The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity and the forms
of those actions have been abolished. The court has jurisdiction in an action of
ejectment to award the plaintiff all the relief to which it is entitled." (Italics
ours.) At p. 463, 138 N. E. 4o8. But the language of the code itself is equally
confusing. See for example N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 5o4 (2) where an "actionin ejectment" is spoken of, although by sec. 8 the forms of action are declared
to be abolished. Probably terms such as this cannot now be eliminated from thelanguage of the law; but the result in the instant case demonstrates clearly the
continual need for a clear analysis of the concepts behind terms used in judicial
reasoning.
" The result in this ease illustrates the general uselessness of classifications for
any but the purpose in hand when they are made. It also exemplifies the con-fusion in procedural law that is continually resulting from the common con-
stitutional provisions mentioned supra note 2. See CoMsENTs (1923) 32 YALELAW JouRNAL, 7o7, This provision necessitates classifying actions as the court
was compelled to do in Syracuse v. Hogan in order to reach any decision at all.Such classification, it seems, must of necessity be made in terms of the old pro-
cedure; yet when this is done, confusion almost inevitably results from this use
of what are, under code procedure, essentially and for almost every other pur-pose, false labels. But in view of the popular sentiment attaching to the right
of trial by jury, amendments abridging this right can hardly be hoped for.
"At p. 463, 138 N. E. 408.
'The court cited Real Prop. Law (N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 51) sec. 529;
but section 529 refers only to nuisance cases. The court did not specify injunc-
tive relief in its enumeration, but the statement quoted supra note 4 seems toindicate a recognition of this possibility. Yet the dissent clearly proceeded on
the contrary assumption.
" N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 504 provides for the enforcement of a final judg-
ment by execution, "(i) Where it is for a sum of money in favor of either party;
or directs the payment of a sum of money. (2) Where it is in favor of theplaintiff in an action of ejectment or for dower. (3) In an action to recover
a chattel, where it awards a chattel to either party." N. Y. C. P. A., sec. o5provides for enforcement of judgments by the contempt process, "(i) Where thejudgment is final and cannot be enforced by execution, as prescribed in the last
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instant case refused explicit mandatory relief as unnecessary since, it
held, the non-mandatory judgment that the plaintiff was entitled to
possession constituted an implied order to the defendant, which he was
bound to obey or be adjudged in contempt. This possibility has
never even been suggested in the New York cases where such injunc-
tions as that here contended for have heretofore been granted.8
In view of the history and interpretation of the provisions of section
505 of the Civil Practice Act, it seems unlikely that the statement of
the court in Syracuse v. Hogan is to be accorded its most obvious and
literal meaning. The section has been consistently construed as pro-
viding in subdivisions (i) and (2) for'enforcement by contempt pro-
ceedings only in the case of judgments or parts of judgments for
which enforcement by execution is not provided in the preceding sec-
tion.9 Since that section provides expressly for the enforcement by
section. (2) Where the judgment is final and part of it cannot be enforced by
execution, as prescribed in the last section, in which case the part or parts which
cannot be so enforced may be enforced as prescribed in this section. . . ." These
sections replaced secs. i24o and 1241 of the N. Y. C. C. P. 1876, the language of
which sections was identical. These, in turn, replaced sec. 285 of the Code of1849 which provided: "Where the judgment requires the payment of money or
the -delivery of real or personal property, the same may be enforced in those
respects by execution as provided in this title. Where it requires the performance
of any other act," the contempt process was made available. This section
replaced sec. 240 of the original Code of 1848, the language of which was iden-
tical therewith in so far as the matters here under discussion are concerned.
' Wheelock v. Noonan (1888) io8 N. Y. 179, 15 N. E. 67; Baron v. Korn (1891)127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804; Mulrein v. Weisbecker (1899, ist Dept.) 37 App.
Div. 545, 56 N. Y. Supp. 24o. The inadequacy of the "legal" remedy is elsewheregenerally recognized and made the basis for the issuance of an injunction direct-ing removal by the defendant, except in those cases where, according to the rulefollowed in some jurisdictions, the equities should be balanced. ComMENTs(1918) 27 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 265; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.gig) sees. 1921 and 1922. The injunction has been occasionally denied on theground of the adequacy of the "judgment in ejectment." Beck v. Ashland CigarCo. (1911) 146 Wis. 324, 13o N. W. 464. But such cases seem out of touch
with reality.
"Weight is lent to this interpretation by the language of the provisions in the
codes of 1848 and 1849 of which provisions those under discussion are clearly
only an elaboration. See supra note 8. The following cases are in accord withthis view: O'Gara v. Kearney (879) 77 N. Y. 423; Heughes v. Galusha Stove
Co. (1907, 4th Dept.) 122 App. Div. 118, io6 N. Y. Supp. 6o6; Coffin v. Coffin(1914, Ist Dept.) 161 App. Div. 215, 146 N. Y. Supp. 565; Leerburger v. Watson(1915, ist Dept.) 169 App. Div. 48, 154 N. Y. Supp. 577; People, ex rel. Fries,
v. Riley (i88i, Sup. Ct. 2d Dept.) 25 Hun, 587; People, ex rel. Borst, v. Grant(1886, Sup. Ct. Ist Dept.) 41 Hun, 351; Taber v. Jack (1891, Sup. Ct. 5th Dept.)
12 N. Y. Supp. 645; Kittel v. Stueve (1895, N. Y. Com. P1.) ii Misc. 279, 32N. Y. Supp. 272. Both commitment and execution are available in the case ofjudgments for alimony but only because of a special statutory provision. N. Y.
C. P. A. 1921, sec. 1172 (formerly N. Y. C. C. P. 1876, sec. 1773). Jacquil v.Jacquin (1886, ist Dept) 2 How. Pr. (x. s.) 2o6. Likewise in the case of judg-
ments within subdivision (4) of N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, sec. 505.
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execution of judgments in "ejectment,"'10 the court in the instant case
seems in error in not granting the explicit injunctive relief."' The
declaration of a contempt under the provisions under discussion has
been held to be discretionary with the court ;12 and as the courts are
in general very loath to invoke this drastic measure save in cases of
disobedience to some clear and specific order, it seems very doubtful
that a court would order a commitment for breach of an order existing
only by implication. The courts have refused to declare contempts in
such circumstances in cases clearly within the provisions of the section."
'0 See supra note 7.
The complaint in the instant case asked only for possession and damages for
the withholding thereof. But the defendant answered and the issues raised were
settled in the plaintiff's favor b3r a jury trial. Prof. Rothschild in his
article The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York (1924) 24 CoL L.
RYxv. 7;32, 740, expresses the opinion that the instant case may perhaps be justified
by this omission of the plaintiff to ask in terms for the injunctive relief; but in
view of the statutory provision expressly to the contrary no such justification is
possible. N. Y. C. P. A. 1921. sec. 479. See Clark, The Union of Law and
Equity (1925) 25 COL. L. Rav. i. The court itself does not mention the prayer
for relief as affecting the judgment to be rendered. Cf. (1924) 33 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 881.
Cochranes Executor v. Ingersoll (1878) 73 N. Y. 613.
A3 judgment debtor cannot be punished for contempt in refusing to deliver
his property to a receiver appointed to receive the same in proceedings supple-
mentary to execution, when the order appointing such receiver contains no direc-
tion to the debtor to make such delivery and when no subsequent order to this
effect has been made. Watson v. Fitzsimnons (855, N. Y. Super. Ct. Spec. T.)
5 Duer, 629. Similarly, in the case of a receiver appointed in an action to settle
the affairs of a partnership, where the order to the defendant has been omitted.
McKelsey v. Lewis (1877, N. Y. Super. Ct. ) 3 Abb. N. C. 6I. And even where
the order appointing the receiver directed the debtor to assign and convey to
the receiver his real estate but contained no direction to him to surrender pos-
session, his refusal to relinquish possession has been held no contempt though
a breach of legal duty. Tinkey v. Lanrgdon (i88o, N. Y. Sup. Ct Spec. T.) 60
How. Pr. i8o. In Heughes v. Galusha Stove Co. supra note 9, there is a state-
ment that, because there is in N. Y. C. C. P. 1876, sec. 1240 (now N. Y. C. P.
A. i921, sec. 504) no provision for the enforcement by execution of a judgment
that a nuisance be abated, such a judgment will be construed as a direction to the
defendant to abate the nuisance, to be enforced under the provisions of the next
section. But since no contempt was in fact declared in that case, the statement
was a mere dictum and the court itself admitted that it had no authority for the
point. It seems unlikely that it would be followed, as it is out of line with the
usual practice as indicated above. Since the right to injunctive relief would be
in such a case a matter of course, it seems that the plaintiff should move to have
the judgment amended. See Herpe v. Herpe (1919) 225 N. Y. 323, 122 N. E.
2o4. The rule that a court will not declare a contempt except for disobedience to
a clear and specific order is subject to an exception where a defendant .does some
affirmative act calculated to bring to naught the mandate of the court,,even though
the act done has not been forbidden and even though the defendant may have
complied with the letter of the order actually issued. Archer v. Turbo-Electric
Construction Co. (1914, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 86 Misc. 310, 149 N. Y. Supp. 200.
See also Foster v. Townshend (1877, N. Y. Ct. of App.) 2 Abb. N. C. 29.
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If, then, the past practice be followed and the declaration of a con-
tempt based on the judgment finally entered in this case be refused,
the effect, in view of the rule in New York that a subsequent suit to
obtain injunctive relief will not be heard, 4 is, it seems, to deny the
plaintiff all practical remedy. It seems wholly desirable that a judg-
ment for possession, rendered osf the merits, be made in some effective
way enforceable; but if the contempt process is to be invoked, a clear
and specific direction to the defendant seems, in view of the existing
practice, indispensable and, as a measure of protection to the defend-
ant,"5 by no means undesirable.
What then, should be the procedure where such direction is not
contained in the judgment rendered? A separate suit to obtain such
an order need not be required; in fact any consistent blending of law
and equity forbids it. The separate suit in such a case under the old
practice was analogous to the creditor's bills on unsatisfied money
judgments. In each the object was to make effectual a previous ad-
judication of substantive rights. The defendant's duty-to pay in the
one case and to vacate the premises in the other-was iri each as per-
fectly established before as after the successful suit in equity. The
4
-ahl v. Sugo, supra note 2- This much criticized case is undoubtedly sound
under the existent practice in requiring a plaintiff to whom the futility of the pro-
cedure is patent to refrain from using the courts to obtain judgments in them-
selves useless and to refrain from harassing his defendant with several actions
where one will serve and with the costs of executions that cannot but be fruitless.
Whether we take the view of the court in that case and of Prof Clark, that
there is only one cause of action and several rights of action (Clark, Code Cause
of Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 817), or that of Prof. McCaskill, that
there are several causes of action (McCaskill, Teaching Pleading So as to Meet
Future as Well as Present Needs (1924) 5 Am. L. ScHr. REv. 286), should make
no difference; for when public policy demands, as a measure calculated to help
clear a crowded docket and as a measure of protection to defendants from harass-
ment, that a plaintiff be compelled to obtain all the relief to which he is entitled
in one action, mere theoretical severalty of causes should not stand in the way,
where, as in Hal v. Sugo, the interests of the plaintiff will not be compromised.
Cf. (I922) 22 CoL. L. REv. i8o. But in discussions of that case it seems gen-
erally to be overlooked that Hahl v. Sugo would very probably not be regarded
as authority for denying supplementary injunctive relief where the plaintiff had
proceeded on a reasonable belief in the efficacy of the possible non-injunctive
relief. See page ii6 of the opinion, 62 N. E. 137. Wheelock v. Noonm, supra
note 8, suggests such a case-as where the plaintiff, having had no warning of the
condition before access to the premises, finds himself, upon execution, in nominal
possession of premises from which he is for all practical purposes ousted by large
quantities of waste materials or worthless personal property belonging to the
defendant.
"'It is impossible to follow the court in the instant case in its reasoning that
"being unauthorized and also unnecessary.. . it (the injunctive relief) may..*.
be prejudicial to the defendant. . ." Instead, the explicit order would, if the
court were correct in its contention that an implied order could be made the basis
of contempt proceedings, protect him by giving fair notice of exactly what was
expected of him.
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effect of these suits was merely to add "another sanction to the defend-
ant's duty.16 The essential nature of the creditor's bills has long been
recognized in New York, and as a quicker and simpler substitute there-
for the "special proceedings supplementary to execution" have been
provided.'7  The omission to provide a similar procedure in the case of
unavailing judgments for possession seems almost certainly to have been
a mere oversight to be explained, perhaps, by the much lesser frequency
of these cases. An assimilation of procedure in the two cases would
seem to be desirable.' It would obviate the wasteful duplication of
actions feared by Judge Cardozo in his dissent in Syracuse v. Hogan9
which dearly it was the object of the court in Hahl v. Sugo20 to pre-
vent. At the same time it would save a plaintiff, the merit of whose
case is res adjudicata, from being left without practical relief from the
continuing wrong of his defendant. Simplification of practice2' and
avoidance of excessive penalties for purely procedural errors are alike
the objects of a reformed procedure.
" This is most apparent in the case of continuing trespass. There the defen-
dant's duty remains the same but to the sanction of successive judgments in tres-
pass is added the threat of commitment if the duty to discontinue the trespass is
not performed. Wheelock v. Noonan, supra note 8.
" N. Y. C. P. A. 1921, art. 45. See Joyce v. Spaford (1885, N. Y. Sup. Ct.
4 th Dept.) 9 Civ. Pro. Rep. 342.
" The strong analogy between the two cases might seem to warrant judicial
legislation to effect the assimilation, but the prohibition in N. Y. C. P. A. I9i,
sec. 989 of special proceedings for the recovery of real property except in cases
specially prescribed by law, would probably be held to cover the practice above
suggested. But the section, it seems, has never been construed..
"Supra note x.
" Supra note 2.
'The unavailing judgment for possession is like the unsatisfied money judg-
ment in that the right to injunctive relief in both cases depends on the showing
of facts additional to those necessary to entitle to the judgment already obtained.
The right is not a matter of course as in nuisance cases in New York such as
Heughes v. Galuza Stove Co., supra note 13. Hence there could be in New
York no remedy by motion to amend which was suggested as the proper pro-
cedure under the circumstances of the Heughes case supra. But the New York
rule as to amendments as set forth in Herpe v. Herpe, supra note 13, is a stricter
one than is generally followed. See Tyler v. Aspinwall (9oo) 73 Conn. 493,
47 Atl. 755; I Black, Judgments (i89i) sec. 153. Under the more general rule
it would seem that a liberal court might well grant an injunction on motion to
amend, if presented at the same term in which judgment was given. The old
common law courts during the same term freely granted by way of amendment
whatever further relief within their power was shown to be necessary to vindi-
cate adjudicated rights. Why a court vested with both common law and equity
powers should refuse equitable relief by way of amendment in a proper case is
not quite clear. Courts of equity were accustomed to grant injunctive relief
supplementary to their own decrees. But the desired result could be obtained
more easily in New York, it is believed, by making the injunctive relief available
by special proceedings supplementary to execution.
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HUSBAND'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS WIFE'S TORTS
The common law disabilities of a married woman were evolved
largely by deduction from a few medieval principles.1 Upon marriage,
the bride passed from the protectorate of her family into the vund-
the profitable guardianship which the husband had over the wife
and her property. Thus condemned as a legal non-entity, she had no
power to contract. Although a married woman had the capacity to
commit torts, she could not sue or be sued without joinder of her
husband. This was not a mere rule of procedure 3 but substantially4
affected the rights and duties of the husband. He was subject to a
judgment against his person 5 and execution on his property. The
canonist's conception that man and wife are one flesh" was advanced
as a formal justification for this reasoning, but the real basis seems to
have been the need, under the econonic adjustments of marriage, for
an effective pecuniary responsibility which the husband alone was able
to bear.
With the economic and social strengthening of woman's position,
relief was sought for the feme coverte in equity.7 The rules there
created were, with some modifications, later crystallized into statute.
Like all reform legislation, there was an imperfect fusion of the old
and the new. The proprietary disabilities of the wife were removed,
but in respect to the responsibilities of the husband, the legislature was
See 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (3d ed. 1923) 530-533.
".. . the main idea which governs the law of husband and wife is not that
of an 'unity of person,' but that of the profitable guardianship, the inund." i
Pollock &"Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. i889) 485; 2 ibid. 405.
' It was stated in Drury v. Dennis (i6o7, K. B.) Yelverton, io6, that the hus-
band is joined "for conformity only." See Hatchett v. Baddeley (1776, C. P.)
2 W. BI. io79, io8i; dissent of Lord Justice Moulton in Cuenod v. Leslie [igog]
i K. B. 88o. This expression was the basis of the idea that the rule was merely
procedural.
'"After all, what makes a defendant liable is a judgment' against him."
Edwards v. Porter (1924, H. L.) 4i L. T. F_ 58, 67. The husband is answer-
able though separated from his wife. Head v. Briscoe (1833, C. P.) 5 C. & P.
484. But a divorce or decree of separation discharges. Capel v. Powell (864)
17 C. B. (T. s.) 743; In re Beauchamp [i9o4] I K. B. 572, 581. Death of the
wife abates the action. Capel v. Powell, supra; Roberts v. Lisenbee (1882) 86
N. C. 136. If the husband dies, the action continues against the wife but not
against his legal representatives. Douge v. Pearce (1848) 13 Ala. 127; Smith
v. Taylor (7852) 11 Ga. 2o.
'After judgment, both husband and wife could be imprisoned under a capias.
Scott v. Morley (1887) 2o Q. B. Div. I2o. See Ivens v. Butler (1857, Q. B.)
7 El. & B1. 757.
'This reason was most commonly "advanced by the medieval lawyer for the
disabilities of the wife. i Blackstone, Commentaries,4*442; see Capel v. Powell,
supra note 4.
'The wife's disabilities were modified (i) by the enforcement of contracts
entered into before marriage and (2) by use of the machinery of the trust. 5
Holdsworth, op cit. supra note i, at pp. 31o-3i5.
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silent.8 In Edwards v. Porter (1924, H. L.) 41 L. T. R. 57, a married
woman, by fraudulently representing that she had the authority of
her husband to borrow money, secured a loan from the plaintiff for
her own purposes. Husband and wife were made joint defendants.
The House of Lords there stated, the Earl of Birkenhead and Viscount
Cave dissenting, that the husband is still answerable for the torts of
his wife9 committed without his authority or participation, notwith-
standing the Married Women's Property Act of 1882.:' But the
husband was actually relieved from responsibility in that case on the
ground that the fraud was "directly connected with the contract of the
wife."'1  The injured plaintiff is offered an alternative remedy-to sue
the married woman alone, enforcing the judgment on her separate
estate, or by joining the husband and wife, to secure a joint judgment
'Section 14 of the Married Women's Act of 1882, however, expressly pro-
vided that "a husband shall be liable for his wife's ante-nuptial contracts and
torts to the extent of property which he has acquired through her and not
otherwise."
9 This question was first presented to the Divisional Court in Seroka v. Katten-
burg (1886) 17 Q. B. Div. 177, and the decision retaining responsibility was
affirmed in Earle v. Kingscote (igoo, C. A.) 16 T. L. R 51. It was doubted
by Lord Justice Moulton, dissenting in Cuenod v. Leslie, supra note 3, and
expressly rejected in Australia in Brown v. Holloway (igog) io Comm. L. IL 89.
" "A married woman shall be capable of entering into and rendering herself
liable in respect of and to the extent of her separate property on any contract
or in tort or otherwise, in all respects, as if she were a feme sole, and her
husband need not be joined with her as plaintiff or defendant or be made a
party to any action or other legal proceeding brought by or taken against her;
and any damages or costs recovered by her in any such action or procdeding shall
be her separate property; and any damages recovered against her in any such
action or proceeding shall be payable out of her separate property and not
otherwise." Sec. I (2)."
I "When the fraud is directly connected with the contract of the wife, and
is the means of affecting it, and parcel of the same transaction, the wife cannot
be responsible and the husband sued for it together with his wife." Liverpool
Assoc. v. Fairhurst (1854) 9 Exch. 422. Since neither a married woman nor her
husband were liable for her unauthorized contracts, responsibility would not be
indirectly sustained by framing a contract action in tort. Wright v. Leonard
(1861) I C. B. (Y. s.) 258; Cole v. De Trafford (1917, K. B.) 117 L. T. R.
(N. s.) 224; (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 564. A similar doctrine exists for
a tort "connected with the contract" of an infant. Slayton v. Barry (igoo) 175
Mass. 513, 56 N. E. 574; Lowery v. Cate (igoi) io8 Tern. 54, 64 S. W. io68.
But the exception is inapplicable where the gist of the action is fraud. Burdett
v. Horne (1911, K. B.) 27 T. L. IL 4o2. Or if a married woman is empowered
by statute to contract See Whitney Hardware Co. v. McMahon (1921) iii
Tex. 242, 231 S. W. 694. In the instant cage the female defendant purported
only to contract as agent for her husband; but a contractual basis was found in
an "implied warrant of authority." Collen. v. Wright (1857, Q. B.) 7 El. & B1.
301. See McNeal v. Hawes [1923] I K B. 273. It has been suggested that this
obligation is not contractual and that the exception should be limited to the
wife's contracts made for her own benefit. (1923) 156 LAw TIMEs, 246; (1924)
40 L. QuART., REV. I, 3.
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against both. The majority regarded the act as one to free the married
woman and not to assist the married man. Her economic status did
not yet justify sole responsibility, and, strictly construing the statute,
further reform must come from the legislature.1 2 The dissent argued
that the joinder was "for conformity only," and the original reasons
found in the proprietary disabilities and in "the universal rule that a
feme coverte could not be a sole plaintiff or sole defendant" were gone.
With the failure of the reasons, the rule fails.
In this country,13 most states have now either by express statute,14
or by implication from the enabling acts,15 completely wiped out the
husband's responsibility. A few still cling to the common law rule,16
and, at least four have statutes expressly imposing responsibility.'7
There are some jurisdictions in which the husband is a proper but not
a necessary party.'" But he is not liable for costs nor is his property
subject to execution. With the destruction of the substance, the
joinder is regarded as a harmless formality.
Any determination of the husband's responsibility is inextricably
linked up with the form of property holding. It would seem that under
the system of comhmunity ownership, a peculiar institution of joint
holding inherited from the civil law, and now in force in some of the
'For a discussion of the principle of strict construction of statutes in dero-
gation of the common law as applied to Married Women's Acts, see Black,
Construction and Interpretation of Statutes (1896) 244. This problem of "judi-
cial legislation" also arises in the right of the wife to sue her husband and in the
abolition of estates of entirety by implication from the Acts. Crowell v.
Crowell (192o) i8o N. C. 516, io5 S. E. 2o6 (right to sue); COMMENTS (1924)
33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 315; Hoyt v. Winstanley (1922) 221 Mich. 515, 1gI N.
W. 213 (estates of entirety). NoTEs (924) 37 HARv. L. REV. 616.
"Where the tort was "connected with the separate property of the wife" the
earlier American cases made an exemption which is not found in England.
Quilty v. Battie (3892) 135 N. Y. 201, 32 N. E. 47 (harboring a vicious dog on
separate estate owned by the wife); Harrington v. Jaginetty (1912) 83 N. J.
L. 548, 83 AtI. 88o (negligent operation of elevator by an employee in a hotel
owned and managed by the wife alone).
"About 20 states have such statutes abrogating the common law. For
example, see Killingsworth v. Keen (3936) 89 Wash. 597, 154 Pac. 3O96; Claxton
v. Pool (1917, Mo.) 197 S. W. 349.
"The leading case in this country overruling the common law by implication
from the enabling statutes is Martin v. Robson (1872) 65 Ill. 129. See Schuler
v. Henry (9o8) 42 Colo. 367, 94 Pac. 360; Hageman v. Vanderdoes (914) 15
Ariz. 312, 338 Pac. 1053.
"Morgan v. Kennedy (1895) 62 Minn. 348, 64 N. W. 912; Poling v. Pickens
(1911) 70 W. Va. 117, 73 S. E. 251; Whitney Hardware Co. v. McMahon, supra
note ii; Meeks v. Johnston, (1923, Fla.) 95 So. 670.
"IN. C. Consol. Sts. 19ig, sec. 2518; Ga. Civ. Code, 1911, sec. 4413; Nev. Rev.
Laws, 3932, sec. 4989; Wis. Sts. 1923, sec. 2608; see Young v. Newson (392o)
i8o N. C. 315, 3O4 S. E. 66o; Griffin v. Miller (1923) 29 Ga. App. 585, ii6 S.
B. 339.
'Conn. Gen. Sts. 3918, sec. 5634; Ariz. Civ. Code, 393o, sec. 3o2; Burt v.
McBain (1874) 29 Mich. 260; Hagemnan v. Vanderdoes, supra note 15.
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western states, a simple solution is offered. But curiously, the com-
munity is subject to judgment execution for the debts and torts of the
husband, but not for the debts and torts of the wife.' 9 Where both
spouses have equal interests in the property, it seems that the com-
munity should be liable for the obligations of the wife.20  In Texas,
where the husband's responsibility is retained, execution of the judg-
ment is made first on the separate property of the wife, then on the
community holdings, and, if these fail, on the husband's separate
estate.
21
Does any reason for imposing such responsibility on the husband
still exist? It is true that the wife is no longer "under the rod ;1122
that many of the consequences of the nound and the fiction of legal
unity have now disappeared; that she may sue and be sued. But the
basis of the principle, the necessity for a pecuniary responsibility, is
still important. The husband is the head of the family. He is under
a duty to support and maintain his wife.23  She renders him family
services.24  It cannot be said that as between husband and wife, each
have equal opportunities for the acquisition of a separate estate. To
deny the responsibility of the husband is to admit that the propertyless
married woman, though she lives in wealth, may injure with impunity.
Such responsibility is harsh; but so is the doctrine of respondeat
superior in the relationship of master and servant. These results are
drawn inevitably from societal structure.25 Unless marriage dwindles
"Evans, Community Obligations (1921) IO CALIF. L. REv. 120. Professor
Evans is of the opinion that the community property should not be burdened
with the separate debts or torts of either spouse. But for a debt or fort "con-
nected with the interests of the community" the community is held liable. Milne
v. Kane (I911) 64 Wash. 254, 116 Pac. 659.
'Under the California or single ownership theory of community property,
the force of this suggestion is not applicable. See NOTES (1924) 13 CALIF.
L. REv. 48, note IO. The various theories are discussed in Evans, The Owner-
ship of Community Property (192) 35 HAxv. L. REv. 47; COMMENTS (1924)
33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 541.
"Zeliff v. Jennings (1884) 6I Tex. 458. It is submitted that the English doc-
trine could be soundly limited so that the wife's separate estate be exhausted
before recourse could be had to the husband's property. See Wyo. Comp. Sts.
1920, sec. 4981.
'The common law presumption of coercion has been practically destroyed.
Mortoi; v. State (1919) 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644; Bevins v. Commonwealth
(1924, Ky.) 264 S. W. 2063; (1925) 25 Co. L. REv. IOO.
13The extent to which this duty has been carried is shown in the recent case
of Lanyon!s Detective Agency v. Cochrane (1924, Ist Dept.) 21o App. Div. 59o,
206 N. Y. Supp. 392. The husband was chargeable with the costs of a detective
hired by the wife to secure evidence as the basis for a decree of separation.
'A contract to pay for such services even if outside the duties of the domestic
circle has been held nudum pactum. In. re Kaufmann (19oo, E. D. N. Y.) 104
Fed. 768; Lewis v. Lewis (1922) 196 Ky. 7O, 245 S. W. 5op; (1923) 21 MIcH.
L. REV. 8o8.
"Women have an unequal" share of the responsibilities of sex and repro-
duction just as certainly and justly as man bears an unequal share of the respon-
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into a union of economically independent individuals, free to work and
to earn, 26 the problem of responsibility remains. But it is not peculiar
to the relationship of husband and wife. Contrary to the popular im-
pression, the father is not liable for the unauthorized torts of his
child,27 although many fathers do assume responsibility. Nor can we
say that the pauper has the same pecuniary responsibility as the man
of wealth. Upon this latter fact is predicated the master's responsi-
bility for his servant's torts.
28
Faced with the necessity for pecuniary responsibility, some courts
have apparently destroyed the "anomaly" of charging the husband
with his wife's torts, at the expense of re-creating it in a different
form. Thus, by the "family car"2 9 doctrine the husband is answer-
able for the negligence of his wife while driving the car on her own
business. This is in the face of express statute abrogating the hus-
band's responsibility for the post-nuptial torts of his wife. The social
result is undoubtedly justified.
It may be that the majority of jurisdictions in this country have
more accurately, in a broad aspect, sensed the greater social desirability.
If convenience dictates that all husbands should be unburdened, the
remedy of the occasional plaintiff who is injured by a propertyless
married woman, must succumb. Furthermore, the doing away with
the husband's responsibility may be more supportable as a means than
as an immediate result. Equalization of responsibilities is an impor-
tant step in the modem struggle to completely emancipate women.
Until, however, there is a further readjustment in the economic rela-
tionship of man and wife, the question remains for the present whether
the necessity for a pecuniary responsibility exists with sufficient force
to retain the rule.
sibilities of property, war, and politics. The reasons are found in the ultimate
physiological facts by virtue of which one is a woman and the other a man."
Sumner, Folkways (i9o6) 361.
'Only 9% of married women in the United States are engaged in gainful
occupation. (ig20) Abstract, U. S. Census, 556.
" Schouler, Domestic Relations (5th ed. 1895) sec. 423.
' In the law of master and servant, just as in the relationship of husband
and wife, the fiction of "identity of person" was the formal justification for
responsibility. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (192o) 81-ii6.
'Plasch v. Fass (i919) 144 Minn. 44, 174 N. W. 438; Stickney v. Epstein
(1923) ioo Conn. 170, 123 At. i; (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNA,, 78o; contra:
Bretzfelder v. Demaree (i921) 1o2 Ohio St. 1O5, 130 N. E. 5o5. When the car
is owned by the wife alode, it is a tort connected with her separate property
and her husband is not responsible. Foster v. Ingle (1923, Tenn.) 246, S.
W. 530.
